Tag: Grenfell

My daughter-in-law, a pharmacist, was aghast when I explained how the construction industry operates, particularly in the context of ‘Design and Build’ and our lax controls pertaining to specification, quality, monitoring, and control. So, with the publication of the Grenfell Inquiry’s Phase 2 report on 4 September, I thought it useful to view our culture and protocols through the lens of her industry – one that also carries enormous responsibilities in terms of product design, specification and application.

Based in a major teaching hospital and research centre, her team prepare complex medications – not the sort you routinely pick up against your family G.P.’s prescription. Hers is the world of serious therapeutics, often concocted in very small batches particular to the needs of one specific patient: usually within her own hospital, sometimes in other hospitals, occasionally an outpatient. 

Some of Lizzie’s most challenging work is in paediatrics; tiny little mites for whom dosage, content and strength can be a life-or-death issue. But irrespective of the utilisation of a product, or the role of any individual during the various stages of production, the same absolute rigour applies across the entire process. 

It starts with team admission: every task is defined and allocated and only those properly trained, qualified, and registered for that task are admitted. And then only within the remit of that qualification. There are no exceptions to this rule. None. Compare that to our industry with its lack of training and qualification amongst so many of its trades and installation personnel.

Next comes method: every process is pre-defined and planned. Conditions for successful execution are established at the outset and maintained through to completion. No short-cuts are contemplated. No compromises are tolerated. Compare that to our industry….

Throughout all this is control: this is established and maintained with an awesome rigour and to the most exacting of standards. Checking and re-checking is systematic at every stage and sub-stage. Even the checking regimes are checked and re-checked. All with a diligence akin to that of the aviation world. Compare that to our industry…

Finally, accountability: sign-off is always attributable to one person whose responsibility is underpinned by absolute authority. Compare that to our industry…. 

Against her background of professional rigour, you won’t be surprised to learn that my daughter-in-law was shocked – seriously shocked to the point of being speechless – when I explained how today’s British building industry still works. You know the stuff, but let me recount my summary:

Since the abandonment of traditional procurement and the advent of D+ B contracting which is now routine for all but the smallest domestic jobs, architects (together where appropriate with other design consultants) are routinely ‘novated’ and come under the day-to-day direction of construction managers. 

I explained that such ‘managers’ rarely understand the design processes that they are managing, and all too often don’t understand the construction processes either. Yet under them the architect’s authority has been severely undermined, particularly in areas of final material and component selection, and the inspection of work in progress on site. I advised that architects are often not retained during construction, and that even when they are their site inspection visits are routinely restricted in number and scope, whilst their authority to condemn sub-standard work, or report it to the client, is normally barred under the terms of their engagement.

I reported that one ‘client-side’ project manager (a QS by training) once opined early in the delivery phase of one of our projects that ‘the further architects were kept from site the better’. I kid not! 

I expounded on the quality problems by confirming that aside from plumbing and electrics, there is barely any kind of apprenticeship or formal training scheme for builders’ trades. And rarely any qualification, certification, or registration system: as beggars belief, complex installation work (for example the cladding system to a high-rise building) is frequently, indeed usually, carried out by people with no formal training.

But that was the least of it: I then explained the sub-contracting arrangements that extend supply chains causing breaks to both lines of authority and accountability, producing conditions in which those who finally generate the design information for a cladding system, and those who install it, may be both unqualified and unsupervised in their work. 

We can further compare our industry’s culture and training with that of nurses when administering drugs: Gizella, a specialist in paediatrics, told me of her profession’s checklist of ‘the six principal rights’: right drug, right dose, right route (oral/intravenous etc.), right time, right patient, right documentarian. If such a checklist had been applied to the Grenfell Tower over-cladding work, non-code-compliant insulation would not have been installed, the correct cavity barriers would have been installed in all the positions required, and the documentation would have been consistent.

I tried to explain to Lizzie that we do have good D+B firms that take their responsibilities seriously, but that was to no effect. Coming from a highly disciplined, highly structured and highly accountable industry and profession, she had heard enough. Her response should be a wake-up call for us all:

She was astonished that our industry allows, nay promotes, the passing of responsibility ‘down line’ without any proper regard for briefing or day-to-day supervision. She couldn’t believe that people with no proper qualifications or training are allowed to install, fix, cover over and cover up work that has not been seen, checked, and re-checked before being properly signed off by anyone with bona fide understanding of the task in hand, the standards to be met, and the codes to be complied with. 

As reported above, the pharmaceutical industry has got all this pretty well sorted, although Lizzie emphasised that they continue to strive for further improvements. Indeed, we don’t have to look any further than the pharmaceutical industry to find a complete ‘oven ready’ operational system that would be instantly applicable and appropriate our industry.

Under it four key rules would apply:

1) Products, components, and materials would, wherever appropriate (for example, within walling systems) be tested and certified in the combinations in which they are to be used prior to final selection and delivery. 

2) Clear, written instructions regarding assembly and installation of all products, components and materials would be mandatory. Such instructions would have to be strictly complied with and ANY deviation to product, material, or component affecting its composition or installation would have to be pre-approved by the designer and/or manufacturer.

3) ONLY trained, qualified and certified personnel would be allowed to install any product, component, material, or system that has life safety significance. Yes, that would mean that a compartment wall, or a fire door, or a cavity barrier could only be erected or installed by a trained qualified and certified person.

4) All work would be systematically benchmarked at the outset of each construction stage or process to establish base standards and, thereafter, systematically inspected and signed off against that benchmark by a person certified as competent to so inspect before the work is ‘covered up’. 

All sounds obvious, doesn’t it? Sure. So why don’t we do it? 

The reason is simple: there has never been the will within, or any meaningful authority upon our industry. It employs 2.3 million people and has a £281 billion turnover representing 6% of our national economic output, yet it has, for too long, resisted reform.

It must be made to radically transform and then conform to reasonable expectation. Some of the framework for such reform was laid in the reports of Dame Judith Hackitt and Paul Morrell who, at invitation of government reported, respectively, on the Building Regulations and Fire Safey, and on the Construction Product Testing Regime. Now, as of 4 September with the publication of the Grenfell Inquiry Phase 2 recommendations, the country and its construction industry have a clear roadmap for change. 

If we adopt just a smidgen of the culture and protocols of the pharmaceutical industry in pursuit of that change, our industry would be transformed beyond expectation.   

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The spectacle of so many of the so-named ‘core participants’ seeking, during their evidence, to blame others presented an all too unedifying spectacle during the Grenfell Inquiry proceedings. As far as architects are concerned, the position of Studio E is of particular importance.

In this respect, the following denouements from the Inquiry’s Executive Summary to its Phase 2 report published on 4 September make for sober reading for our profession:

Studio E…….took a casual approach to contractual relations. (para 2.74)

……..As architect Studio E was responsible for the design of the external wall and for the choice of the materials used in its construction……..as the client wanted to reduce the cost by using ACM rainscreen panels, it was the responsibility of Studio E to determine whether the use of such material would enable the building to comply with functional requirement B4(1) of the Building Regulations……Studio E therefore bears a very significant degree of responsibility for the disaster. (para 2.79)

These stark conclusions are especially notable in their firm rejection of the evidence of Studio E’s Neil Crawford who, within his written statement and under examination, had claimed that:

……….Studio E was only responsible for checking Harley’s drawings and specifications for “architectural intent”, by which he (Mr Crawford) meant conformity with the preliminary design only. 

In dismissing that assertion, the Inquiry affirmed that:

His (Mr Crawford’s) understanding was inconsistent, however, with the terms of its contract with Rydon, which included seeking to ensure that all designs complied with the relevant statutory requirements. (para 63.39 Vol 4)

This should act as a sharp warning to all architects to look carefully at the conditions contained within their appointments. This is especially the case with larger and more complex jobs that usually adopt Design and Build procurement routes. Add to that the ambiguities that can arise in terms of liability through the common provision of so-called ‘design portions’ by specialist sub-contractors (as so often the case with modern ‘systems’ of construction) and all the ingredients are there for chaos. But be under no illusion; confusion of this kind has long existed across our industry: to our collective shame, the Grenfell Tower fire had, for too long, been a disaster in waiting.

Such mayhem should not exist and must be eradicated without more ado if we are to ensure that we have proper conditions under which we can, as architects, effectively and fully discharge our responsibilities 

So, we should all take this as a mighty, much overdue, ‘wake-up’ call. Some architects have, of course, long been diligent in this respect, but most need to look far more carefully at their appointment documents. We should also insist on sight of the engagement terms of others who might be contributing to design to ensure that any overlaps and ambiguities relating to responsibilities are eradicated. We owe it to ourselves, our clients, our insurers, our profession, and above all, to those who depend on us and our industry for the design and delivery of safe buildings. 

It is simply not good enough for an architect to examine a sub-contractor’s cladding drawings on the basis of checking for compliance with some vague notion of architectural intent (whatever that might mean) when the appointment has called for the production of full RIBA Stage EFG information in old language (RIBA Stages 4 and 5 today). The Grenfell Tower Inquiry determined that this remains the case even where there has been some overlap in the responsibilities of architects with other sub-contractors whose contracts might include ‘specialist sub-contractor design portions’. 

Much of confusion has of course arisen through a misunderstanding of the term ‘design’ and the rapid increase in the use of bespoke contracts that both developers and D+B companies nowadays prefer (in lieu of the various RIBA offerings) for their appointments. Such bespoke forms, all too often hastily cobbled together on a ‘cut and paste’ basis, frequently seek to duplicate the same responsibilities across multiple parties, no doubt in the belief that such ‘belt and braces’ strategies will somehow protect those appointing by spreading risk and accountability as far, and as wide, as possible.

The problem with such strategies is that they can, and usually do, confuse roles and responsibilities in exactly the way that the Inquiry determined had happened around the development of the cladding package during the Grenfell Tower project. There, risks were compounded as the D+B contractor, post accepting the architect under novation, pushed through so-called value engineering changes in pursuit of ill-considered cost cuts. Such late changes following D+B contractors’ appointments are endemic in our industry, creating havoc across the board as rapid redesign and changes to specification is all too often inadequately researched due to lack of time, or fee, or both.  

None of that might, of course, matter to those who partake in such reckless process until something goes wrong. Then, everyone finds themself engulfed in lengthy and complex litigation. When it goes as badly wrong as happened during the over-cladding works for Grenfell Tower, the consequences in terms of suffering and human tragedy are beyond measure.

Muddle around design responsibilities was, of course, not the only issue that contributed to the failings at Grenfell Tower, as the Inquiry’s far-reaching report makes so clear. But it is a discrete issue that needs major and urgent attention across both our profession and our industry. 

As with many areas of practice the structural engineers have had these matters well covered for years and its high time architects followed suit: don’t leave your contracts to others to sort out: get on top of these matters! Ensure that responsibilities are clearly defined, especially between those responsible for design and compliance with building regulations and those responsible for fabrication and manufacture. And if you have, under contract, assumed responsibility, then deliver the goods… 

Above all, don’t accept liability under circumstances where you don’t have the authority to control your work product. As one old sage, known to us all, says: ‘No responsibility without authority’.

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