The spectacle of so many of the so-named ‘core participants’ seeking, during their evidence, to blame others presented an all too unedifying spectacle during the Grenfell Inquiry proceedings. As far as architects are concerned, the position of Studio E is of particular importance.
In this respect, the following denouements from the Inquiry’s Executive Summary to its Phase 2 report published on 4 September make for sober reading for our profession:
Studio E…….took a casual approach to contractual relations. (para 2.74)
……..As architect Studio E was responsible for the design of the external wall and for the choice of the materials used in its construction……..as the client wanted to reduce the cost by using ACM rainscreen panels, it was the responsibility of Studio E to determine whether the use of such material would enable the building to comply with functional requirement B4(1) of the Building Regulations……Studio E therefore bears a very significant degree of responsibility for the disaster. (para 2.79)
These stark conclusions are especially notable in their firm rejection of the evidence of Studio E’s Neil Crawford who, within his written statement and under examination, had claimed that:
……….Studio E was only responsible for checking Harley’s drawings and specifications for “architectural intent”, by which he (Mr Crawford) meant conformity with the preliminary design only.
In dismissing that assertion, the Inquiry affirmed that:
His (Mr Crawford’s) understanding was inconsistent, however, with the terms of its contract with Rydon, which included seeking to ensure that all designs complied with the relevant statutory requirements. (para 63.39 Vol 4)
This should act as a sharp warning to all architects to look carefully at the conditions contained within their appointments. This is especially the case with larger and more complex jobs that usually adopt Design and Build procurement routes. Add to that the ambiguities that can arise in terms of liability through the common provision of so-called ‘design portions’ by specialist sub-contractors (as so often the case with modern ‘systems’ of construction) and all the ingredients are there for chaos. But be under no illusion; confusion of this kind has long existed across our industry: to our collective shame, the Grenfell Tower fire had, for too long, been a disaster in waiting.
Such mayhem should not exist and must be eradicated without more ado if we are to ensure that we have proper conditions under which we can, as architects, effectively and fully discharge our responsibilities
So, we should all take this as a mighty, much overdue, ‘wake-up’ call. Some architects have, of course, long been diligent in this respect, but most need to look far more carefully at their appointment documents. We should also insist on sight of the engagement terms of others who might be contributing to design to ensure that any overlaps and ambiguities relating to responsibilities are eradicated. We owe it to ourselves, our clients, our insurers, our profession, and above all, to those who depend on us and our industry for the design and delivery of safe buildings.
It is simply not good enough for an architect to examine a sub-contractor’s cladding drawings on the basis of checking for compliance with some vague notion of architectural intent (whatever that might mean) when the appointment has called for the production of full RIBA Stage EFG information in old language (RIBA Stages 4 and 5 today). The Grenfell Tower Inquiry determined that this remains the case even where there has been some overlap in the responsibilities of architects with other sub-contractors whose contracts might include ‘specialist sub-contractor design portions’.
Much of confusion has of course arisen through a misunderstanding of the term ‘design’ and the rapid increase in the use of bespoke contracts that both developers and D+B companies nowadays prefer (in lieu of the various RIBA offerings) for their appointments. Such bespoke forms, all too often hastily cobbled together on a ‘cut and paste’ basis, frequently seek to duplicate the same responsibilities across multiple parties, no doubt in the belief that such ‘belt and braces’ strategies will somehow protect those appointing by spreading risk and accountability as far, and as wide, as possible.
The problem with such strategies is that they can, and usually do, confuse roles and responsibilities in exactly the way that the Inquiry determined had happened around the development of the cladding package during the Grenfell Tower project. There, risks were compounded as the D+B contractor, post accepting the architect under novation, pushed through so-called value engineering changes in pursuit of ill-considered cost cuts. Such late changes following D+B contractors’ appointments are endemic in our industry, creating havoc across the board as rapid redesign and changes to specification is all too often inadequately researched due to lack of time, or fee, or both.
None of that might, of course, matter to those who partake in such reckless process until something goes wrong. Then, everyone finds themself engulfed in lengthy and complex litigation. When it goes as badly wrong as happened during the over-cladding works for Grenfell Tower, the consequences in terms of suffering and human tragedy are beyond measure.
Muddle around design responsibilities was, of course, not the only issue that contributed to the failings at Grenfell Tower, as the Inquiry’s far-reaching report makes so clear. But it is a discrete issue that needs major and urgent attention across both our profession and our industry.
As with many areas of practice the structural engineers have had these matters well covered for years and its high time architects followed suit: don’t leave your contracts to others to sort out: get on top of these matters! Ensure that responsibilities are clearly defined, especially between those responsible for design and compliance with building regulations and those responsible for fabrication and manufacture. And if you have, under contract, assumed responsibility, then deliver the goods…
Above all, don’t accept liability under circumstances where you don’t have the authority to control your work product. As one old sage, known to us all, says: ‘No responsibility without authority’.
E N D